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PRESCRIPTIVE AND HOLISTIC 
CONTEXTUALISM: EMERGING VARIANTS OF 
MODERN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
 
Debate over the proper approach to modern contract interpretation continues even in this 
era of modern contract interpretation where context is always considered. This paper 
identifies and contrasts two rival approaches to contract interpretation: “prescriptive 
contextualism” which demands that contract interpretation start with plain meaning, and 
only then go on to consider textual context, extra-textual context and finally commercial 
sense; and “holistic contextualism” which involves consideration of those same factors 
but is not fussy about the order. In setting out the two approaches, I provide an exposition 
of the present law of contract interpretation. Then, I consider the main arguments that can 
be advanced by proponents of the two approaches, and conclude by offering my own 
arguments that, I suggest, tip the scales in favour of holistic contextualism: the 
prescriptive process inhibits identification of viable interpretation, and is overly 
dependant on which words are used to start the interpretive process. 
 
I Introduction 
The central thesis of this paper is that two competing conceptions of the principles of 
contract interpretation, which take different approaches to the proper role of plain 
meaning and contextual evidence in the interpretive process, have emerged in the modern 
era of iterative contextual contract interpretation. The first is prescriptive contextualism: 
contract interpretation is properly performed by starting with a consideration of plain 
meaning, then textual context, then extra-textual context, and finally commercial sense, in 
that order. The second is holistic contextualism: interpretation is a unitary exercise 
involving consideration of those same elements, but does not demand that they are 
considered in a specific order. 
Part two of the article considers the two approaches in more detail. I have 
endeavoured to set out the most plausible construction of each. I begin by observing the 
many features that the two approaches have in common: they can both be described as 
modern, contextual, objective and iterative; plain meaning and commercial sense play a 
role in the interpretive process for both; and both are concerned with the post-hearing 
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formal analysis of interpretation. Then, I describe how the two approaches differ, in terms 
of methodology and expected judgment structure. Finally, I set out the steps of the 
prescriptive process in detail, giving some examples of cases where it could be suggested 
that a court had reason to depart from plain meaning in one of the steps. 
Part three of the article sets out the main arguments raised in the debate about 
which approach is preferable. After noting that the most recent leading authority, Wood v 
Capita,1 is in the holistic camp, I go on to consider the major points of dialogue: whether 
the prescriptive approach offers certainty and the relative desirability of certainty, the 
importance and feasibility of constraining judicial thought, whether the prescriptive 
approach misconstrues the fundamental role of context, and whether prioritising plain 
meaning respects party autonomy. Of course, much has been written about contract 
interpretation, with authors taking different positions on various aspects of the process. 
Here, I have generally focused on recent pieces of writing that help illuminate the specific 
debate between prescriptive contextualism and holistic contextualism as a methodology 
for interpreting express terms.2 The clearest support for the prescriptive approach is found 
in Anthony Grabiner’s 2012 article “The Iterative Process of Contractual Interpretation”.3 
  
1 Wood v Capita Insurance Systems Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173. 
2 So, I have not engaged in detailed discussion of the debate over other issues in construction, such as the 
admissibility of prior negotiations or the relationship between interpretation and implication. 
3 Anthony Grabiner, “The Iterative Process of Contractual Interpretation” (2012) 128 LQR 41. The 
following recent articles in particular, I would identify as being broadly in favour of a prescriptive 
approach: Rohan Havelock, “Return to Tradition in Contractual Interpretation” (2016) 27 KLJ 188 and 
Yihan Goh, “From Context to Text in Contractual Interpretation: Is there really a Problem with a Plain 
Meaning Rule?” (2016) 45 CLWR 298. In terms of judgments, I would suggest that the following in 
particular are capable of being read as consistent with the prescriptive approach: that of Lord Neuberger P 
(with whom Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes agreed) in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] A.C. 
1619 and that of McGrath, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd 
[2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR. 432. See also Lord Sumption’s extra-judicial speech “A Question of 
Taste: The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of Contracts” (Harris Society Annual Lecture, 8 May 
2017) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170508.pdf [Accessed 3 July 2018] and, from another 
judge writing extra-judicially, James Spigelman, “From Text to Context: Contemporary Contractual 
Interpretation” (2007) 81 ALJ 322.  
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David McLauchlan has been a consistent academic voice for a contextual approach to 
contract interpretation more in alignment with what is described herein as the holistic 
approach.4 A clear judicial exposition of the holistic approach can be found in the 
judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Wood v Capita, given by Lord 
Hodge.5  
Part four of the article seeks to add to the dialogue. In my view, the case for each 
side is reasonably balanced, once we discard straw man theories of interpretation. 
However, I offer two arguments that I consider tip the scales in favour of holistic 
contextualism. Both concern the starting point of prescriptive contextualism: a 
consideration of the plain meaning of the centrally important words in the contract for the 
dispute in question. The first argument is that the prescriptive methodology can inhibit 
identification of viable interpretations, which I illustrate with reference to a case that was 
recently the subject of a judgment of the New Zealand Supreme Court.6 Setting out the 
first argument helps highlight the importance to the prescriptive process of picking the 
right centrally important words, which then leads on to the second argument: the 
prescriptive process relies on identifying the centrally important words, but that will not 
always be easy or even possible. 
  
4 Dating back at least to David McLauchlan, “The Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Interpret Written 
Contracts” (1974) 6 NZULR 121. Most recently, see David McLauchlan, “Some Fallacies Concerning the 
Law of Contract Interpretation” (2017) LMCLQ 506 and “The ICS Principles: A Failed 'Revolution' in 
Contract Interpretation?” (2016) 27 NZULR 263. 
5 Wood v Capita, above n 1. Lord Hodge’s earlier judgment in Arnold v Britton , above n 3, also reflects the 
same approach. See also in particular Glazebrook J in New Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Association Inc v Air 
New Zealand Ltd (Air Line Pilots’) [2017] NZSC 111, [2017] 1 NZLR 948 and Tipping J in Vector Gas Ltd 
v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd (Vector Gas) [2010] NZSC 5, [2010] 2 NZLR. 444. 
6 Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, at 948. 
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II  Prescriptive Contextualism and Holistic Contextualism 
A  What the two approaches have in common 
1  Modern 
Prescriptive contextualism and holistic contextualism are varieties of modern contract 
interpretation. That is, they belong to the era of contract interpretation following Lord 
Hoffmann’s re-statement of contract interpretation in the Investors Compensation Scheme 
(ICS)7 case as being a process governed by the following principles:8 
1. Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person appraised of all the contextual background material 
which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in 
which they were at the time of the contract; 
2. That contextual background material includes whatever evidence a reasonable 
person would consider is of assistance for the task described in principle 1; 
3. Prior negotiations and declarations of subjective intent are inadmissible as a 
pragmatic policy choice rather than because a reasonable person would think them 
necessarily irrelevant; 
4. The meaning that a reasonable person would give to a document in its context is 
not the same thing as the meaning of the words of the document — context can 
allow a court to conclude that the parties intended something other than what their 
words, without context, would normally suggest; and 
5. As a matter of common sense, where words do have a plain meaning, that is 
probably the meaning that the parties intended. However, just because words do 
have a plain meaning, that does not require judges to attribute to the parties a 
  
7 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (ICS) [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at 
912-913. The principles are summarised for brevity and consistency with the language used in this article. 
8 See Havelock, above n 3, at 188-189: “the dominant modern approach to contractual interpretation in the 
Commonwealth [is] represented by the ‘restatement’ of principles by Lord Hoffmann in [ICS]”. 
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meaning that they plainly could not have had, for example when that meaning is 
commercially absurd. 
Lord Hoffmann’s presentation of interpretation as a process governed by principles 
stands in contrast with the traditional era of understanding of interpretation as a process 
governed by rules. Two rules in particular loomed large in pre-ICS contract 
interpretation: the parol evidence rule (evidence extrinsic to a written contract was 
inadmissible for the purposes of contract interpretation, with limited exceptions including 
ambiguity)9 and the plain meaning rule (if words used in a contract have a plain meaning, 
then the parties must be taken as having intended that meaning).10 
There is room for argument over the extent to which ICS marked a genuine turning 
point in the substance of the law away from an era of strict literalism towards 
contextualism,11 or whether ICS is better understood as bringing to the surface a rich vein 
of pragmatic and contextual thinking that already existed in the case law.12 Either way, 
the point of the label ‘modern’ in this article is to locate prescriptive and holistic 
contextualism in the post-ICS era, where commentary on contract interpretation tends to 
take the ICS principles as a starting point, and the ongoing discussion is on how to best 
elucidate those principles. 
  
9 For example, see Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Railway Authority of New South Wales [1982] 149 
CLR 337 (HCA) at 352 and Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2003] 3 WLR 1371 at [49]. 
10 For example, see Melanesian Mission Trust Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1997] 1 
NZLR 391 (PC) at 395-395. 
11 See David McLauchlan, “The New Law of Contract Interpretation” (2000) 19 NZULR 147 at 148: “A 
quiet revolution in the law of contract interpretation has taken place.” 
12 See in particular Lord Bingham, “A New Thing Under the Sun? The Interpretation of Contract and the 
ICS Decision” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, Gerard McMeel, “The Principles and Policies of 
Contractual Construction” in Andrew Burrows and Edwin Peel (eds.), Contract Terms (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007) 27, Havelock, above n 3, at 190-191 and Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [10]. 
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2  Contextual 
Prescriptive contextualism and holistic contextualism are both contextual approaches to 
interpretation. For each, evidence outside of a written contract both can and ought to be 
considered by a court in determining the meaning of that contract. Contractual meaning is 
to be discovered with reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background 
knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them 
to be using the language in the contract to mean”, as Lord Hoffmann stated in 
Chartbrook.13 This can be contrasted with approaches that impose an additional hurdle 
before a court can consider extra-textual evidence, such as that the text of the contract 
must be ambiguous. Both approaches are also contextual in the sense that they reject the 
proposition that words have an innate meaning discoverable without reference to 
context.14 
3  Objective 
Contract interpretation is performed objectively. The meaning of a contract is determined 
by considering what a reasonable person would think the parties intended. Evidence that 
does no more than state what one of the parties was intending is disregarded,15 as is 
context known to only one of the parties.16 Both approaches are objective in this sense, 
and we cannot sensibly choose between the two on the basis that one is objective and the 
other is not. 
4  Iterative 
Both approaches are ‘iterative’ in the sense that the task of interpretation involves the 
repetition of a process. The first notable judicial description of interpretation as an 
  
13 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101 at [14]. 
14 See Lord Hoffmann, “The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings” (1997) 114 SALJ 656 at 670. 
15 See ICS principles 1 and 3 discussed above at ‘A.1. Modern’ and Havelock, above n 3, at 206. 
16 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [21]. 
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iterative process appeared in Lord Neuberger’s judgment in the Court of Appeal in Sigma 
Finance:17 
[W]here the interpretation of a word or phrase is in dispute, the resolution of that 
dispute will normally involve something of an iterative process, namely checking 
each of the rival meanings against the other provisions of the document and 
investigating its commercial consequences.  
 That description has proven influential. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lord 
Mance stated that it was “right” to observe that the process of interpretation in a case like 
Sigma Finance was an iterative process,18 which Lord Clarke then referred to in Rainy 
Sky.19 In a 2012 article titled “The Iterative Process of Contractual Interpretation”, Lord 
Grabiner QC endorsed what he took to be “Lord Neuberger’s iterative process”,20 which 
has a fundamental role in Grabiner’s exposition of interpretation.21 More recently, Lord 
Hodge, giving the judgment for the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Wood v Capita, 
stated that the exercise of interpretation “involves an iterative process”.22 
 The two approaches differ on what is being iterated, the details of which we will 
return to shortly. In brief, the prescriptive approach repeats the consideration of the 
parties’ objective intentions while taking into account incremental aspects of the context, 
while the holistic approach repeats a unitary process of construction for each rival 
interpretation. 
  
17 Re Sigma Finance Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 1303, [2009] BCC 393 at [98]. Lord Neuberger dissented on 
the correct interpretation on the facts of the case. 
18 Re Sigma Finance Corp at [12]. 
19 Rainy Sky, above n 19, at [28]. 
20 Grabiner, above n 3, at 46. 
21 Grabiner’s article, “The Iterative Process of Contractual Interpretation”, above n 3, has been noted in 
several judgments, including Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [93], Marks & Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities 
Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742 at [71]. 
22 Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [12]. Lord Hodge also stated at [13] that: “The iterative process … assists 
the lawyer or judge to ascertain the objective meaning of disputed provisions.” 
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5  Plain meaning plays a role 
Prescriptive contextualism and holistic contextualism both accept, as Lord Hoffmann did, 
that words can have a plain meaning. The ‘plain meaning’ of both approaches is the same 
entity, and it is worth setting out clearly what the ‘plain meaning’ of modern contract 
interpretation is. In terms of terminology, in this article I generally use ‘plain meaning’ 
for brevity but courts sometimes speak of ‘plain meaning’, ‘ordinary meaning’, “natural 
meaning”,23 or use similar language24 or some combination of such words.25 Regardless 
of the exact language used, the basic concept is the same:26 
 Words X in a contract have a plain meaning if, and only if, a reasonable person 
taking into account the conventional meaning of the words and phrases that constitute X 
would think that there is one meaning Y, out of all the possible things that X could mean, 
that is far more likely than any other meaning to be what the parties intended by X. 
The concept that individual words and phrases can have conventional meanings is 
embedded in the concept of plain meaning. Meaning Y is within the set of conventional 
meanings of word or phrase X if people can reasonably say ‘when people say X, Y is one 
of the things they usually mean by X’.27 Conventional meaning is distinct from literal 
meaning, because words are not always commonly used in their literal sense, and is not 
the same thing as dictionary meaning, because dictionaries list possible meanings, not all 
of which will be in common usage. 
  
23 For example Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [18]-[20] (although “natural and ordinary” is used at [15] in 
the same decision). 
24 For example, “popular” meaning in Manufacturers’ Mutual Insurance Ltd v Queensland Government 
Railways (1968) 118 CLR 314 (HCA) at 321 and Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty 
Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 271.  
25 For example, Lord Hoffmann used “plain and ordinary meaning” in ICS, above n 7, at 913, “natural and 
ordinary” Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [88] per Elias CJ, and Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [15] per Lord 
Neuberger P. 
26 See Goh, above n 3, at 304.  
27 See Hoffman, above n 14, at 658 and Sir George Leggatt “Making Sense of Contracts: The Rational 
Choice Theory” (2015) 131 LQR 454 at 468-469. 
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A word or phrase has a plain meaning if there is one conventional usage that is far 
more common than any other.28 For example, I would suggest that the conventional uses 
of the word ‘park’ as a noun include ‘a grassy area’ and ‘a place to put one’s car’, but 
only the former meaning is the plain meaning. 
Moving beyond words and phrases to larger groups of words, it is not uncommon 
for judges to state a view on the plain meaning of a clause in a contract.29 This is an 
important shift, because the plain meaning of a contractual clause cannot, as a general 
rule, be defined simply as the most likely conventional meaning of that clause. This is 
because a clause in a contract, unlike commonly used phrases, will generally not have 
any conventional usage. The idea of conventional meaning requires the particular 
collection of words to have an established usage. However, the wording of contractual 
clauses will, in many cases, be a novel combination of words crafted to achieve the 
parties’ particular purposes.30 So, it would normally be quite odd to say something like:31 
When people say “23.4% of the price achieved for each Residential Unit in excess of 
the Minimum Guaranteed Residential Unit Value less the Costs and Incentives”, 
they normally mean Y. 
 So, the conventional meaning of the words in a clause can operate as a reference 
point for the determination of the plain meaning of the clause, but the plain meaning of a 
clause cannot simply be defined, as a rule, as the conventional meaning of the clause, 
  
28 See Grabiner, above n 3, at 43: “The natural or ordinary meaning of a word is the meaning that most 
people would understand it to have and that is derived from the way in which most people use that word in 
everyday communication.” 
29 For example, Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [15]: “the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause”), 
Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [88]: “Where contractual language, interpreted in the context of the contract as a 
whole, has a natural and ordinary meaning, the courts will generally give effect to that”, , above n 7, per 
Lord Lloyd at 905: “what I have called the plain meaning of section 3(b)”, and Arnold v Britton, above n 3, 
at [24]: “When one turns to clause 3(2) of each of the 91 leases of the chalets in Oxwich Park, the natural 
meaning of the words used, at least until one considers the commercial consequences, seems clear.” 
30 Of course, there will be some instances where the same standard clause occurs in many contracts, and it 
might be that sometimes such clauses will develop conventional usage. But that will not always be the case. 
31 This was the contractual clause at issue in Chartbrook, above n 13, at [9]. 
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because there generally will be no such thing. Neither can the plain meaning of a clause 
sensibly be deduced, as a rule, by assuming that each individual word in a sentence has 
its individual plain meaning. 
 Rather, determining the plain meaning of a clause is an exercise of judgement. It 
is a complex evaluation that requires weighing up the possible meanings of each word 
(conventional and otherwise) simultaneously, before arriving at an overall assessment of 
the intended meaning. To draw on my earlier example, the meaning of the word ‘park’ 
can differ depending on whether it is used as a noun or a verb, which must be determined 
by a consideration of the other words in the sentence and the way they are put together. 
 Thus, the determination of plain meaning is an art rather than a science.32 
Furthermore, in the context of contract law, it is a job for judges, not linguists. It requires 
knowledge of conventional syntax and grammar in addition to conventional meaning, as 
well as some understanding of the things that words refer to in the world, and of the goals 
that contracting parties might have — a “vast background of facts and a framework of 
mental assumptions”, as Lord Hoffmann put it.33 It is that knowledge that allows a court 
considering a clause to make an assessment of what the parties are likely to have intended 
based on the words that they used.34 
 Plain meaning is an important concept for both iterative and holistic 
contextualism; it is not the case that plain meaning is important for one approach but not 
the other. They differ on whether recognising the importance of plain meaning 
necessitates commencing interpretation with consideration of plain meaning.  
  
32 See Johan Steyn, “The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts” (2003) 25 Sydney Law 
Review 5 at 8. Compare Frederick Schaeur, “Formalism” (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 509 at 527-528. 
33 Hoffmann, above n 14, at 658.   
34 See Glazebrook J in Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, at [191] citing Lord Hoffmann in Charter Reinsurance 
Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] A.C. 313 (HL) at 381: “the meaning of words is so sensitive to syntax and context, 
the natural meaning of words in one sentence may be quite unnatural in another.”  
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6 Commercial sense plays a role 
For both approaches, commercial sense plays a part in the process of interpretation. 
‘Commercial sense’ can be used to refer to the broad notion of a set of expectations that 
judges have about how commercial parties usually behave, the sorts of decisions they 
typically make, and the sorts of intentions that they are likely to pursue in their 
contracts.35 It can also be used in a narrower sense to refer specifically to consideration of 
the symmetry of the bargain (i.e. the value of what each party gives up and gains from the 
contract) represented by a particular interpretation. The two senses are connected: part of 
the broad notion of commercial sense is the idea that commercial parties typically behave 
like economically rational actors36 and, assuming that both parties are economically 
rational, we would expect that bargains are normally reasonably symmetrical. References 
to ‘commercial sense’ herein typically refer to the narrower sense, taking into account 
that the narrower sense is informed by the broader one. 
Lord Hoffmann explained the basis of the plain meaning rule as being common 
sense presumption that commercial parties have normally chosen their words carefully 
and not made linguistic mistakes.37 We can similarly see commercial sense as being 
based on the presumption that commercial parties have normally weighed their deals 
  
35 Neil Andrews in “Interpretation of Contracts and ‘Commercial Common Sense’: Do Not Overplay this 
Useful Criterion” (2017) 76 CLJ 36 at 37 refers to the broad notion of “commerciality” and identifies at 
least six different ideas included in it: 
(1) commercial documents are to be read from the perspective of commercial users; in particular, 
the commercial reader abhors pedantry, including excessive technicality or semantic logic; (2) the 
court should avoid frustrating the parties’ commercial object or purpose revealed by the 
contractual text and its factual matrix; (3) the adjudicator must understand the trade practices and 
market assumptions within the relevant contractual pigeonhole; (4) inapt words can be overridden 
when manifestly inconsistent with business common sense …; (5) absurd constructions are to be 
avoided; (6) [commercial common sense] can be used as a compass to point the way when the 
court is confronted by rival meanings. 
36 See the discussion of the ‘economic deal’ framework for understanding contracting in Hugh Collins, 
Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) at 129-130. 
37 ICS, above n 7, at 913. 
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carefully and have not made commercial mistakes. The more serious the business mistake 
represented by a particular interpretation, the less likely that that interpretation is what 
was intended.38 Even where it is not the case that one interpretation is commercially 
absurd and the other is not, commercial sense can still assist a court in deciding between 
the two.39   
Of course, we are dealing with a mere presumption, one that can be overcome if 
the balance of considerations points in the other direction. Just as there might be 
something in the context to tell us that the parties did not intend the plain meaning of 
their words, there might be something in the context to explain why one of the parties 
ended up agreeing to a bad, or even extremely bad, bargain.40 In reality, sometimes 
commercial parties do simply make mistakes. Even assuming that contracting parties are 
economically rational actors, there are several reasons why they might enter into a 
bargain that turns out to be a bad one. Asymmetry of information can explain why both 
parties thought that they were entering into a balanced bargain when, in fact, it was much 
better for one of them. And it might be economically rational to enter into a specific deal 
that is a bad bargain in the interests of some longer-term gain. For example, a party might 
offer significant concessions in the interests of forging a new long-term relationship, or 
mending a rift in an established one.41 
  
38 As Lord Reid put it in Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd v L Schuler AG [1974] AC 235 (HL) at 251: 
“The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it”. See 
Andrews, above n 35, at 47-49. 
39 Rainy Sky, above n 19, at [21] and [30], Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [11], and see Andrews, above n 35, 
at 46-47. But the closer the bargain represented by two interpretations, the less likely that commercial sense 
will be of assistance in deciding between the two, see Wood v Capita at [28]. 
40 See Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [20] and [77], Wood v Capita, above n 1,at [11], Firm PI 1, above n 3, 
at [89] and [91] for a discussion of reasons why the correct interpretation might be a bad bargain for one of 
the parties. 
41 For example, the Court of Appeal in Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Vector Gas Ltd, above n 68, at [93] 
thought that the seller might have agreed to a (very) bad bargain to protect their reputation. The Supreme 
Court disagreed, see the discussion below at ‘C.4. Step four: Commercial sense’.  
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7 Concerned with post-hearing formal analysis of interpretation 
Both approaches to contextualism are primarily concerned with describing the discrete 
task of post-hearing formal consideration of interpretation that is then manifested in a 
judgment. Both approaches accept that, before that can take place, a Court has already 
gone through the hearing process and has been exposed to background material and 
counsel’s submissions about possible interpretations, as well as seeing the text of the 
contract itself. Both approaches accept that judges will have given at least passing 
thought to the viability of different interpretations before making final judgment on the 
matter. Neither approach is concerned with trying to marshal the thought processes that 
might occur during a hearing when a judge hears submissions about different 
interpretations and evidence involving both text and context. Accordingly, prescriptive 
contextualism does not seek to re-establish the parol evidence rule and bar judges from 
even considering extra-textual evidence when there is a textual plain meaning, and 
holistic contextualism accepts that there will need to be judicial consideration of the 
words in question before “detailed analysis” commences.42 So, both approaches have the 
same starting point: the court is already familiar with the interpretation dispute and its 
context, and has heard and possible engaged with the parties’ submissions about the 
correct interpretation. Where they diverge is exactly what happens next, which I will now 
explain. 
B  How the two approaches differ 
The prescriptive approach takes the position that the detailed analysis of interpretation is 
an iterative process with a series of discrete steps that must be performed in a proper 
order. The first step is the consideration of the plain meaning of the words in question, 
followed by consideration of the textual context, extra-textual context (often referred to 
as ‘extrinsic evidence’) and, finally, commercial sense. At each stage after the first, the 
court repeats the consideration of the parties’ intentions in light of the new material. 
Deviation from the correct process is an error in law, and risks (but does not guarantee) 
  
42 Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [12]. 
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that the court will arrive at the wrong interpretive outcome. I will discuss the steps in 
further detail shortly. 
By contrast, holistic contextualism sees the process of interpretation as best 
understood as “one unitary exercise” involving consideration of various factors.43 The 
holistic approach rejects the idea of interpretation being, as Lord Hodge put it in Arnold v 
Britton, “a matter of reaching a clear view on the natural meaning of the words and then 
seeing if there are circumstances which displace that meaning”.44 Holistic contextualism 
does not entail the position that there is something inherently wrong with judges in 
interpretation cases working through the particular interpretive issue in a series of steps 
beginning with the plain meaning of the words central to the dispute.45 The difference is 
that holistic contextualism does not demand that all contract interpretation is performed 
that way.46 Rather than being four discrete steps, plain meaning, textual context, extra-
textual context and commercial sense are four necessary considerations in the overall 
holistic process of interpretation, the relative importance of which, and the order in which 
they are addressed, will vary from case to case.47  
 In holistic contextualism, this unitary exercise is repeated for each of the rival 
interpretations under consideration. “[E]ach of the rival meanings is checked against the 
provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated”, as Lord 
Hodge put it in Arnold v Britton.48 That is, interpretation is iterative in the sense that the 
same evaluative process is used for each interpretation under consideration. 
  
43 Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky, above n 19, at [21] and Lord Hodge in Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [76], 
citing Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky. 
44 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [76]. 
45 Lord Hodge in Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [77], Lord Mance in Re Sigma Finance Corp, above n 17, 
at [12], and Glazebrook J in Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, at [191]: “It is also true that any exercise in 
contractual interpretation should generally start with the text.” 
46 See Lord Hodge in Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [12] and [13]. 
47 Wood v Capita at [13] per Lord Hodge. 
48 Wood v Capita at [11]. 
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The following diagram contrasts what is being iterated in each approach: 
 
 
 While we might normally expect the structure of a judgment following 
prescriptive contextualism to follow the prescribed steps, we can expect greater variety in 
judgments applying holistic contextualism both in terms of structure and focus. As Lord 
Hodge put it in Wood v Capita:49 
[O]nce one has read the language in dispute and the relevant parts of the contract that 
provide its context, it does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences 
with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close 
examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances 
the indications given by each. 
In some cases, there might be a compelling basis in the extra-textual context for 
preferring a particular interpretation — if that is so then there may be no need to wade 
  
49 Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [12]. 
Hearing process: introduction to the contract, the background, the dispute, 
rival interpretations, etc. 
Prescriptive Contextualism Holistic Contextualism 
Iterated process: for each rival 
interpretation, consider: 
• plain meaning 
• textual context 
• extra-textual context 
• commercial sense  
as a unitary exercise 
Arrive at a conclusion about which interpretation best reflects the parties’ 
intentions 
Iterated process: consider the 
purpose of the contract and the 
relative viability of interpretations 
afresh in light of: 
1. Centrally important words 
and their plain meaning 
2. textual context 
3. extra-textual context 
4. commercial sense 
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through a detailed textual consideration before turning to the contextual “smoking gun” 
that establishes the parties’ intended meaning. In other cases, such as where the text has 
been forensically prepared by its drafters, it is the detailed textual analysis that will be 
decisive and we might we might expect to see only cursory references to extra-textual 
context and commercial sense. 50 
C  The steps of the prescriptive process 
The overarching goal of the prescriptive process is the determination of the parties’ 
objective intentions. Each stage of the process after the first introduces new 
considerations and then contemplates that goal afresh — that is the iterative nature of 
contract interpretation for the prescriptivist. The overarching consideration of the parties’ 
intentions can be broken down into two related tasks. The parties will usually have put 
forward at least one interpretation each. The court may also identify other possible 
interpretations, and some interpretations might arise after consideration of the context. 
The first task is forming a view on the relative viability of each interpretation. The second 
task is forming a view of the purpose of the contract — that is, the ends that the parties 
are trying to achieve through it. These two tasks are interrelated — the viability of an 
interpretation is informed by the extent to which it appears to achieve the parties’ ends, 
and the process of considering various interpretations assists the court in determining 
what it is that the parties might by trying to achieve. Both the relative viability of 
different interpretations, and the court’s ideas of what it is that the parties are objectively 
trying to achieve, are updated as the wider picture emerges. For prescriptive 
contextualism, it is vital that the performance of those two tasks is marshaled by the 
introduction of new considerations in the proper order.  
 I will now consider each step of the prescriptive process in further detail. The aim 
is to articulate how the four steps in the process can be conceived of as discrete steps that 
proceed in a particular way. For steps two and three, I provide examples of case that can 
be seen as being ones where a reason to doubt the correctness of plain meaning emerges 
at that particular step. The outcomes in these cases could also be produced by the holistic 
  
50 Lord Hodge in Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [13]. 
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approach, but would not need to be explained in terms of a plain meaning presumption 
arising and then being rebutted. Rather it could simply be that, for example, the extra-
textual context provides clear evidence of the parties’ intentions, without delving into a 
detailed and syntactical analysis of the clause in question. 
1  Step one: The centrally important words and their plain meaning 
The court must first identify the centrally relevant words to the dispute,51 and then 
consider if those words have a plain meaning. If there is a plain meaning, then this 
essentially triggers a presumption that that plain meaning is the one that the parties 
intended and is the correct way to interpret the contract.52 The higher the level of 
confidence that there is one plain meaning, the stronger the presumption.53 Each step can 
strengthen, weaken, or possibly overcome that initial view that the plain meaning is the 
right one. Since it is expected that the plain meaning is normally the right one, the other 
three steps will normally function as a kind of cross-check.54 
 Regardless of whether or not the pivotal words have a plain meaning, the Court 
must also consider the viability of any other interpretations that have been put forward. It 
might be, for example, that the words are somewhat ambiguous and there are two viable 
meanings, but one is a slightly more conventional use of language than the other. In such 
a case, the more conventional meaning is slightly ahead in the race, compared to if one 
meaning has a plain meaning, in which case it gets a substantial head start. Of course, 
getting a head start does not always mean winning the race, and sometimes there will be 
something in the later steps that allows another interpretation to overtake the early 
  
51 The “centrally relevant words” in Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [18], the “language at issue” in Firm PI 
1, above n 3, at [63], Grabiner, above n 3, “the words of the provision in question” at 45 and the Court of 
Appeal in Air New Zealand [2016] 2 NZLR. 829: “the words in question” at [40]. 
52 Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [63]: “powerful, albeit not conclusive…” 
53 “[T]he plainer the words, the more improbable it is that the parties intended them to be understood in any 
sense other than what they plainly say” Vector Gas, above n 5, at [23]. 
54 Vector Gas at [24]. 
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favourite. This analogy of plain meaning having a head start in the race does not apply to 
the holistic approach, because plain meaning is not necessarily the starting point. 
2  Step two: Textual context 
The next step is to look beyond the centrally relevant words and consider the rest of the 
text of the contract. Other words in the text might give the court reason to adjust the 
relative viability of different interpretations, might bring to light new possible purposes of 
the contract, and can even raise new ways of interpreting the pivotal words in question. 
 Aberdeen City Council can be explained as a case where textual context gives a 
reason to revisit plain meaning.55 The case revolved around what Lord Hope described as 
a “short point of construction”.56 Stewart Milne Group (Group) purchased land from the 
Aberdeen City Council with a view to developing it. The contract provided that the 
Group would pay the Council a ‘profit share’ if the Group sold the land. The profit share, 
which could also be triggered by a Council buy-back of the land or by the Group entering 
into a long-term lease, was defined as:57 
40% of 80% of the estimated profit or gross sale proceeds or lease value less the 
Allowable Costs [which were concerned with costs associated with obtaining 
planning permission and consents]. 
 ‘Estimated profit’ and ‘lease value’ were both defined with reference to an open 
market valuation.58  
 Arguably, the plain meaning of the pivotal text is that, in the case of a sale, the 
profit share is calculated based on the gross sale proceeds.59 The Group had sold the land 
to an associated company at a price where the gross sale proceeds less Allowable Costs 
meant that no profit share would be payable to the Council. The Council argued that, in 
  
55 Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd (‘Aberdeen City Council’) [2011] UKSC 56. 
56 Aberdeen City Council at [1]. 
57 Aberdeen City Council at [7]. 
58 Aberdeen City Council  at [7]. 
59 See Aberdeen City Council at [21] per Lord Clarke.  
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the case of a sale that was not on the open market, a profit share should be payable based 
on open market value, similar to the calculation used in the case of a buy-back or lease. In 
considering these two readings of the contract, the Supreme Court considered various 
other aspects of the text. Lord Hope observed several “infelicities” of drafting in other 
parts of the contract,60 which could rebut the normal expectation that commercial parties 
have chosen their words carefully and probably intended the plain meaning. More 
significantly, the Court considered that the use of an open market valuation in the 
calculation of the profit share in the case of a buy-back or lease gave an insight into what 
the parties were trying to achieve through the profit share: regardless of what triggered it, 
the profit share was supposed to give the Council a share of the open market value of the 
land.61 In the case of a sale, normally that would be achieved by using the gross sale 
proceeds. However, if the sale was not at arms length on the open market, the parties’ 
intentions would be thwarted by basing the profit share on the actual sale. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court was in agreement that, in the case of a sale to a related party as had 
happened, the profit share was to be calculated based on open market value.62 
3  Step three: Extra-textual context 
The next step is to consider what is sometimes described as extrinsic evidence — “the 
facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document 
was executed” as Lord Neuberger put it in Arnold v Britton.63  
  
60 Aberdeen City Council at [9]. One of these infelicities was that, if read literally, the contract required 
Allowable Costs to be deducted twice, because the definitions of both Estimated Cost and Profit Share 
stated to deduct Allowable Costs. As Lord Hope put it at [9], “that plainly cannot be right”. 
61 Aberdeen City Council at [22] and [32]. 
62 Although Lord Hope and Lord Clarke differed on whether the result was best understood as being 
achieved through interpretation and implication, see [22] and [33] respectively. For present purposes, the 
important point is that they agreed on the intention that could be determined from the text as a whole. This 
can be seen as a case where a strong argument against plain meaning emerges at step two, before even 
having to consider extra-textual context or commercial sense. 
63 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [15]. 
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Where the pivotal words have a plain meaning, in some cases the extra-textual 
context might do nothing to dissuade the initial impression that the plain meaning is 
probably the right one. An example of this is Mobil Oil, where the dispute centred over a 
provision in a lease that required the tenant to “keep” the land “in good order and clean 
and tidy” and “deliver up” the land in “good” and “clean and tidy” condition at the end of 
the lease.64 The central question in the case was whether the provision required the tenant 
to address subsurface contamination that predated the lease. The New Zealand Supreme 
Court found that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision did not 
support the tenant being obliged to transform the land by remediating underground 
contamination that predated the tenancy, and found nothing in the context to suggest 
otherwise.65  
 On the other hand, in some cases there is something in the extra-textual context 
that points away from plain meaning. One example is where a consistent pattern of non-
conventional usage of a word or phrase is evident in the extra-textual context, either in 
communications between the parties or at large within a particular industry, trade or 
locality.66  
 Or, there might be something in the extra-textual context that sheds light on the 
purpose of the contract, as could be said of Vector Gas.67 The contract in that case was 
for the supply of gas, and the dispute was over whether a “$6.50 per [gigajoule]” price for 
gas in the contract was inclusive or exclusive of transmission costs. If the latter, the 
  
64 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v Development Auckland Ltd [2016] NZSC 89, [2017] 1 NZLR 48, see [56] 
for the clause in full. 
65 Mobil Oil at [75], overturning the Court of Appeal Auckland Waterfront Development Agency Ltd v 
Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd 2015] NZCA 380, [2016] 2 NZLR 281, which found that the context drove the 
opposite conclusion, see [62]-[70].  
66 That is, cases where the ‘private dictionary’ principle applies, see Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [84]. For a 
recent example see YL NZ Investment Ltd v Ling [2017] NZHC 1793 at [28]: “this is a private dictionary 
case where the parties have adopted as a term of art the words ‘registered person’ under the GST Act, so 
that terms used in that act apply to the parties.” 
67 Vector Gas, above n 5. 
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purchaser would have to pay extra to receive gas. Arguably, the plain meaning of the 
contract is that the price is inclusive of transmission costs — if the parties had intended 
the purchaser to pay more, they would have said so – and the Court of Appeal effectively 
took that approach.68 However, features of the extra-textual context arguably suggested 
that the parties intended that the price take into account additional transmission costs. The 
contract in dispute was an interim contract put in place while a dispute about a purported 
termination of an earlier contract between the parties for the long-term supply of gas was 
resolved. The interim contract allowed for the supply of gas to continue while the 
underlying dispute was resolved, and, in the event that the supplier’s purported 
termination was upheld (which it ultimately was) for the purchaser to pay, for each 
gigajoule supplied, the difference between the price set out in the earlier agreement and 
$6.50 per gigajoule. 
Blanchard J’s judgment in the Supreme Court shows how this extra-textual context 
could be used to conclude that the $6.50 per gigajoule price was intended to be exclusive 
of transmission costs. Blanchard J stated that, to “fully understand” the interim contract, 
the reader must refer to the earlier contract and “comprehend” that the larger dispute was 
over long-term supply,69 and went on to state that:70 
The words “$6.50 per GJ” also have as an important part of their context or 
background what both parties must have been anticipating would happen if an 
interim agreement were not reached. Putting oneself in the position of the parties in 
that circumstance, it is very easy to see that [the purchaser] was not likely to have 
tolerated a situation in which supply of gas was simply withdrawn by [the supplier] 
pending resolution of the dispute. Absent an interim agreement, [the purchaser], like 
any other purchaser in a similar position, would certainly have sought to have the 
High Court order [the supplier] to continue to supply it on the terms of the [earlier 
contract] until the Court could give judgment on the larger dispute. But, equally 
obviously, the Court would not make such an interim order unless [the purchaser] 
gave an undertaking to meet any loss which [the supplier]might suffer if it were 
ultimately found that [the purchaser]was not entitled to a continued supply at the rate 
provided for under the [earlier contract]. The negotiating parties both would also 
  
68 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Vector Gas Ltd [2008] NZCA 338 at [90]-[98].  
69 Vector Gas, above n 5, [6] 
70 Vector Gas at [7]. 
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readily have perceived that the loss to [the supplier], and therefore what [the 
purchaser] would have to pay under its undertaking, would almost certainly be 
measured by comparing what [the supplier] was likely to receive on the basis of 
current market rates, if it sold the gas to someone else, with the price fixed under the 
1995 Agreement. As Wilson J points out in his judgment, in or around October 2004 
[the supplier] was managing to obtain contracts at an average price of $6.68 per GJ 
plus transmission costs. In contrast, an inclusive price of $6.50 per GJ was the 
equivalent of a gas only price of $4.64 per GJ. 
That background, Blanchard J considered, made it clear that the parties must have 
intended the $6.50 per gigajoule price to be exclusive of transmission costs.  
4 Step four: Commercial sense 
The final consideration is commercial sense. As a discrete and final consideration in an 
iterative process, turning to commercial sense in this final step means considering how 
balanced the bargain is in each interpretation under consideration. In many cases, a court 
will still be weighing up multiple viable interpretations after consideration of extra-
textual context.71 If that is the case, then the relative symmetry of those bargains can 
assist the court in deciding between them. Where the Court has already found something 
in step two or three to doubt that plain meaning reflects the parties’ intentions, that the 
plain meaning is not commercially sensible can lend further support.72 However, 
commercial sense should not generate an entirely new interpretation like a magician 
pulling a rabbit out of thin air, as Andrews put it.73 
  
71 Rainy Sky, above n 19, at [21]. 
72 See Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [69]-[71] for a helpful explanation of why in several cases (The 
Starsin [2003] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 AC 715, Chartbrook, above n 13, Aberdeen City, above n 55, (which I 
discuss above as a case where consideration of textual context points away from plain meaning)) where the 
plain meaning was not commercially sensible, there were also reasons found in the textual and extra-textual 
context for departing from plain meaning. We can add Vector Gas, above n 5, to that list of cases — 
although a plain meaning interpretation of the contract would have been an extraordinarily bad bargain (see 
[82] and [137]), the earlier contract in the extra-textual context also provided a reason to depart from plain 
meaning.  
73 Andrews, above n 35, at 51, and see 50-53 more generally for discussion of this point. 
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Conceiving commercial sense as a discrete step in the iterative process concerned 
with the symmetry of the bargain explains the caution that several leading authorities 
have given about commercial sense. In Firm PI 1, a majority of the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand stressed that (citing Grabiner’s article in support):74 
[W]here contractual language, viewed in the context of the whole contract, has an 
ordinary and natural meaning, a conclusion that it produces a commercially absurd 
result should be reached only in the most obvious and extreme of cases. 
In Arnold v Britton, Lord Neuberger stated that:75 
[T]he reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding 
circumstances … should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the 
language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a 
provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a 
reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most 
obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial 
common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the 
language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the 
parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision 
when agreeing the wording of that provision. 
 In short, commercial sense will almost never operate as a standalone justification 
for rejecting plain meaning. In the context of prescriptive contextualism, where the 
centrally important words have a plain meaning, and consideration of textual and extra-
textual context has not provided a reason to displace the presumption (or has bolstered 
the case for the plain meaning being what the parties intended), the possibility of the 
presumption being displaced after consideration of the symmetry of the bargain is 
vanishingly small. 
 Of course, commercial sense does not operate as a standalone justification for 
overriding plain meaning under the holistic approach either. However, there are different 
reasons for why that is the case. None of the four factors can override another, because 
  
74 Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [93], citing Grabiner, above n 3, at 50. 
75 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [17]. 
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the process of interpretation is a unitary one so it is not helpful to think to think of one 
factor displacing or overriding another. 
III Arguments for and against the two approaches 
It is easy to construct and knock down a straw man version of each approach. An 
approach to contract interpretation that empowers judges to disregard the parties’ words 
and make them a new bargain out of whole cloth must be rejected. Similarly, caricature 
literalism is not a viable approach to contract interpretation.76 The actual debate between 
holistic and prescriptive contextualism is more finely balanced. One reason for this is that 
the two approaches have much in common. Both approaches are unashamedly contextual 
approaches to interpretation, and both take plain meaning and the parties’ decision to put 
a contract in writing seriously. Ultimately, the choice of approach is one upon which 
reasonable people can disagree, and may turn on one’s experience or conception of the 
role of documents and plain meaning in the commercial world. 
 This section is an attempt to capture the reasonable dialogue that can exist 
between supporters of the two positions. In providing arguments that can be put forward 
for the prescriptive side, I turn to Grabiner, who expressly adopts a prescriptive approach. 
I also draw on other jurists who are broadly supportive of an approach to contract 
interpretation that places emphasis on plain meaning, even if they do not explicitly adopt 
the prescriptive approach as I have described it here, to the extent that the arguments of 
the latter group can help bolster the case for prescriptive contextualism. 
 The first five topics of argument are the main points of discussion found in the 
literature: judicial authority for the approaches, whether plain meaning is a necessary or 
useful starting point, certainty, the need to constrain judicial thought and the role of 
context. The final two are two additional arguments that, I would suggest, help swing the 
balance of argument towards holistic contextualism. The first is that the prescriptive 
approach can inhibit the identification of viable interpretations. The second is that the 
pivotal role of the centrally important words poses a problem for prescriptive 
  
76 See Johan Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men” (1997) 113 
LQR 433, pp.440-441. 
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contextualism. These two arguments emerge from an examination of a recent application 
of the prescriptive approach by the New Zealand  Court of Appeal,77 the shortcomings of 
which were identified by the Supreme Court.78 To some extent, they could be seen as a 
development of the more general concern that a focus on specific words in the text may 
not align with the parties’ intentions. That said, they show that the difference between 
prescriptive and holistic contextualism is not merely academic by illustrating how the 
plain meaning starting point can produce anomalous results. 
A  Authority 
Taking Wood v Capita as the leading authority on the principles of contract 
interpretation, it is fairly clear that the weight of authority is now in favour of holistic 
contextualism. Indeed, in light of Wood v Capita, it could be argued that the prescriptive 
approach has never had any support in modern contract law cases. The prescriptive 
process could then be viewed as existing only in the academic literature – a figment of 
Grabiner’s imagination, if anything. 
 Grabiner, writing before Arnold v Britton and Firm PI 1, cites two authorities 
specifically in relation to the parties’ words as the starting point of the iterative process. 
The first is Lord Neuberger’s statement in Re Sigma Finance Corp that:79  
[W]hile one is seeking to interpret the document as a whole, the ultimate issue 
between the parties turns on the meaning of the provision, and, in order to resolve 
the issue, the reasoning and analysis have to start somewhere. The natural, indeed, I 
would have thought, the inevitable, point of departure is the language of the 
provision itself. 
The second is Lord Hope’s statement in Multi-Link Leisure Developments Limited v 
North Lanarkshire Council that:80 
  
77 Air New Zealand Ltd v New Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Assoc Incorp (Air New Zealand) [2016] NZCA 131, 
[2016] 2 NZLR 829 
78 Air Line Pilots’, above n 5. 
79 Sigma Finance, above n 17, at [98], cited in Grabiner, above n 3, at 45 n 16. Emphasis added. I return to 
the question of whether plain meaning is a natural or inevitable starting point immediately after this 
discussion of authority. 
80 Multi-Link Leisure Developments Limited v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 47 at [11]. 
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The court's task is to ascertain the intention of the parties by examining the words 
they used and giving them their ordinary meaning in their contractual context. It 
must start with what it is given by the parties themselves when it is conducting this 
exercise. Effect is to be given to every word, so far as possible, in the order in which 
they appear in the clause in question. Words should not be added which are not 
there, and words which are there should not be changed, taken out or moved from 
the place in the clause where they have been put by the parties. It may be necessary 
to do some of these things at a later stage to make sense of the language. But this 
should not be done until it has become clear that the language the parties actually 
used creates an ambiguity which cannot be solved otherwise. 
 Both of these passages can reasonably be read as suggesting that plain meaning is 
not only important in the process of interpretation, but should be considered first. 
Although neither Arnold v Britton nor Firm PI 1 expressly state that interpretation must 
start with consideration of plain meaning, in my view those decisions can reasonably be 
read as consistent with the prescriptive approach. That is not to say that this is the only 
reading available, as the decisions do not expressly reject the prescriptive approach in the 
way that Wood v Capita does.  
 One point in favour of reading Arnold v Britton in favour of the prescriptive 
approach is that the majority judgment was given by Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord 
Sumption and Lord Hughes agreed), whose judgment in Sigma Finance stressed the 
language of the provision as an inevitable starting point. In Arnold v Britton, he stated 
that the court determines the parties’ objective intentions:81 
by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words … in their documentary, factual 
and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the 
lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts and 
circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was 
executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective 
evidence of any party’s intentions. 
 That listing of factors to assess meaning in light of can reasonably be read as 
setting out the order for consideration of those factors, rather than simply the factors 
themselves. Furthermore, the progression from textual (documentary) to extra-textual 
(factual) and commercial context effectively appears twice in the paragraph. 
  
81 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, at [15]. 
27  
 
 A further point in favour of reading that passage in line with the prescriptive 
approach is that Lord Hodge, who agreed with Lord Neuberger on the outcome of the 
case, chose to give a separate judgment, in which he effectively stated that that outcome 
did not follow from an application of the prescriptive process.82 From this, we might infer 
that Lord Hodge wished to avoid endorsing a judgment that supported, or at least could 
be read as supporting, a more prescriptive approach.  
 Turning now to Firm PI 1, the majority stated that the text “remains centrally 
important” and that, where the “language at issue” has a plain meaning, that is a 
“powerful, albeit not conclusive, indicator” of the parties intentions’, with “wider 
context” potentially providing a basis for departing from a textually “obvious” 
interpretation. The majority then went on to consider the clause at issue in its contractual 
context, before turning to considering whether the “structure of the bargain, any 
specialised meaning, or considerations of commercial absurdity affect that assessment”.83 
That is all at least consistent with the prescriptive approach, and could be read as 
requiring it. Furthermore, the majority cite Grabiner’s article in their discussion of 
commercial sense.84 
 The minority, who came to a different conclusion from the majority on the 
outcome, also thought that the case did not call for general discussion of the principles of 
contract interpretation, but reserved their position on unnamed “matters of some 
controversy in this area of law” which were “touched on” in the majority’s articulation of 
the principles of contract interpretation.85 This might be an indication, like Lord Hodge’s 
judgment in Arnold v Britton, of a reluctance to endorse an exposition of the of contract 
interpretation that is, or could be read as, taking a prescriptive approach. 
 So, in my view, there is a reasonable case that Arnold v Britton and Firm PI 1 
could be read as authorities supporting the prescriptive approach. Some pre-Wood v 
Capita academic and judicial readings of those cases supports that position. Rohan 
  
82 Arnold v Britton at [76]. 
83 Firm PI 1, above n 3, at [63]-[64]. 
84 Firm PI 1 at [93]. 
85 Firm PI 1 at [2]. 
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Havelock described Arnold v Britton as “an effective coup de grâce to the emphasis on 
the wider context in the ICS Restatement”, and, describing the law at the time, suggested 
that “the primary source of meaning is the text itself” which was a departure from the 
“starting point” of the ICS approach.86 The final two arguments in this section arise in 
light of a case where the New Zealand Court of Appeal clearly read Arnold v Britton and 
Firm PI 1 as making consideration of plain meaning the compulsory first step in the 
interpretive process, and chastised the Employment Court for failing to do so, which I 
discuss in detail below.  
 So, in terms of recent authority, proponents of holistic contextualism have the 
clear advantage. Of course, the leading authority can change, and the recent history of 
leading authorities on contract interpretation has swung between those that emphasise the 
importance of context and commercial sense,87 to those emphasising the importance of 
plain meaning,88 then back again.89 And, the question of how the law of contract 
interpretation ought to be configured cannot be answered solely by identifying the 
leading authority. So, I will turn to consider other arguments for and against the rival 
approaches. 
B Plain meaning: the best starting point for determining the parties’ intentions? 
Lord Grabiner claims that: “The process of construction must start somewhere and the 
most natural place to begin is with the words of the provision in question.”90 He suggests 
that plain meaning is a natural and logical starting point primarily because, where words 
have a plain meaning, that is probably the meaning that the parties intended.91 This is not 
just a matter of probability, but of respecting the parties’ autonomy: parties choose 
  
86 Havelock, above n 3, at 200-201. 
87 Rainy Sky, above n 19, and Aberdeen City Council, above n 55, in particular. Vector Gas, above n 5, in 
New Zealand. 
88 Arnold v Britton, above n 3, and Firm PI 1, above n 3. 
89 Wood v Capita, above n 1. 
90 Grabiner, above n 3, at 45. 
91 Grabiner, above n 3, at 45 and see Lord Neuberger in Re Sigma Finance Corp, above n 17, at [98]. 
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written contracts to reduce their obligations to a clear written form. Taking the parties’ 
intentions seriously means taking the written text seriously, which means that the 
language of the document must be the logical starting point.92 
Proponents of holistic contextualism can dispute both parts of Grabiner’s claim. 
First of all, a rejection of the idea that all exercises of construction must start in the same 
place is inherent in holistic contextualism. Of course, simply because an approach to 
interpretation can exist without a standard starting point does not mean that that approach 
should be preferred. The more interesting argument is whether the plain meaning starting 
point is preferable. 
 In rebutting the claim that plain meaning is a sensible starting point, proponents of 
holistic contextualism can argue that their rivals overstate the extent to which, in reality, 
commercial parties actually pay close attention and care to the words of their contracts.93 
If that is the case, then focusing on plain meaning risks undermining the parties’ 
autonomy, rather than supporting it.94 
C Certainty 
One of the claimed merits of the prescriptive approach is that it provides certainty and 
predictability for contracting parties and third parties.95 This predictability means that, in 
terms of future contracts, parties can be reasonably confident that the bargains they make 
will be given effect in the event of a dispute over interpretation, provided that they have 
taken care with their wording. In addition, because of the emphasis on plain meaning 
  
92 See Havelock, above n 3, at 203, Francis Dawson, “Contract Objectivity and Interpretation in the 
Supreme Court” in Andrews Stockley and Michael Littlewood (eds), The New Zealand Supreme Court: 
The First Ten Years (Wellington: LexisNexis, 2015) at p.249. 
93 See a useful discussion of this argument in Catherine Mitchell, “Contracts and Contract Law: 
Challenging the Distinction Between the ‘Real’ and ‘Paper’ Deal” (2009) 29(4) O.J.L.S. 675. 
94 See the discussion in McLauchlan, “Some Fallacies Concerning the Law of Contract Interpretation”, 
p.510 regarding the House of Lords clarifying, rather than departing from, the parties’ intentions in 
Chartbrook, above n 13,. 
95 For example, see Grabiner, above n 3, at 51; Havelock, above n 3, at 202, 206-207, and 208. 
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which is accessible to all parties, anyone looking at a contract is usually able to get a 
good idea of what the parties’ obligations are. 
Proponents of the holistic approach object that the certainty provided by a plain 
meaning- focused approach is overstated. As McLauchlan put it: “The argument from 
certainty might have some merit were it not for the fact that the outcome of interpretation 
disputes is so notoriously difficult to predict anyway.”96 The inherent uncertainties in 
language and the fact that contracting parties cannot be certain of the future conspire to 
make certainty a difficult objective to pursue.  
 In addition, one can question the importance of certainty in contract law – not just 
for the process of contract interpretation but for contract law as a whole. Certainty as a 
goal can be seen as conflicting with fairness, or the ability of the law to respond to 
oppression or imbalances of power.97 Certainty is sometimes argued to be beneficial to 
the promotion of the institution of contracting,98 to promote economic efficiency,99 and to 
be desirable for commercial parties. However, it can be argued that the relentless pursuit 
of certainty can provide a disincentive for people to enter into contracts, thereby harming 
the institution of contracting,100 that the strict rules of classical contract law cannot be 
justified on economic grounds,101 and furthermore it is unclear whether commercial 
parties actually value certainty as highly as some contract law scholars say they do.102 
  
96 David McLauchlan, “A Contract Contradiction” (1999) 30 VUWLR 175, p.189. 
97 See, for example, the discussion in Richard Calnan, “Construction of Commercial Contracts: A 
Practitioner's Perspective” in Andrew Burrows and Edwin Peel (eds.), Contract Terms (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007) 17 at 20. 
98 See, for example, “Is Sanctity of Contract Worth Pursuing? – Reflections on the Function of Contract 
Law” (2000) 16 JCL 148 (also published as John Smillie “Security of Contract and the Purpose of Contract 
Law” (2000) 6 NZBLQ 104). 
99 See, for example, Jonathan Morgan Contract Law Minimialism: A Formalist Restatement of Commercial 
Contract Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
100 See, for example, Richard Sutton, “The Code of Contractual Mistake: What Went Wrong?” (2003) 9 
NZBLQ 234, pp.240-241. 
101 See, for example, John Gava “Can Contract Law Be Justified on Economic Grounds?” (2006) 25 UQLJ 
2 at 253 and John Gava “What We Know About Contract Law and Transacting in the Marketplace – A 
Review Essay of Catherine Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Law Practice: Bridging the Gap Between 
Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation and Jonathan Morgan Contract Law Minimalism: A 
Formalist Restatement of Contract Law” (2014) 35 Adel L Rev 409. The former article of Gava’s in part 
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D A prescriptive process: necessary to control judicial thought, or unnecessary 
and useless? 
To put it bluntly, proponents of prescriptive contextualism can argue that the law must 
make interpretation a prescriptive process because judges cannot be trusted with a free-
form one. This is classic formalistic thinking: rules are needed to prevent “misguided, 
incompetent, wicked, power-hungry, or simply mistaken decisionmakers whose own 
sense of the good might diverge from that of the system they serve.”103 In the sphere of 
contract interpretation, arguably, there is an acute risk that courts will try and improve on 
the parties’ bargain instead of simply recognising it.104 There are three aspects of modern 
contract interpretation that proponents of prescriptive contextualism are especially 
concerned with: the use of extra-textual context, commercial sense reasoning, and the 
notion of commercial purpose. These three things all, unless constrained, give courts far 
too much latitude to make a contract for the parties, even when the words used have a 
plain meaning.105 Grabiner states that the risk is heightened because counsel for a party 
trying to escape the consequences of a clearly worded contract will often invite the court 
to look outside the words to “find” the commercial purpose of the bargain, and then 
override the plain meaning with that supposed purpose.106 Again, this is reflective of a 
 
responds to Smillie’s article (above n 98). For commentary on Gava’s critique of Smillie, see Simon 
Connell “Contract Law, Contracting and Instrumentalism” in S. Griffiths, M. Henaghan & M. B. Rodriguez 
Ferrere (eds.), The Search for Certainty: Essays in honour of John Smillie (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 
2016). 
102 See Catherine Mitchell, Interpretation of Contracts (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) at 99 for a 
review of empirical research on whether parties desire certainty or flexibility in the law of contract 
interpretation. 
103 Schaeur, above n 32, at 543. 
104 See, for example, Martin Hogg, “Fundamental Issues for Reform of the Law of Contractual 
Interpretation” (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 406 at 420 and Andrews, above n 35, at 59-61.  
105 See, for example, from a practitioner’s perspective, Calnan above n 97. 
106 Grabiner, above n 3, at 49. See also Andrews, above n 35, at 62: “Partisan arguments are often dressed 
up as issues of [commercial common sense]: judges should not be beguiled by forensic rhetoric which is a 




formalistic approach to law: judges are prone to being bamboozled by crafty lawyers, and 
accordingly firm rules are needed. 
Supporters of prescriptive contextualism consider that these risks can be managed 
by channeling judicial thinking through the prescriptive process. This allows courts to 
consider extra-textual context and commercial sense as part of the interpretive process, in 
contrast to imposing rules of admissibility that might deny context entirely, but puts those 
aspects of the context in their place as sub-ordinate and subsequent considerations to the 
text. The prescriptive process, argues Grabiner, prevents a court from being “distracted 
away from the more important question, namely, the meaning of the contract as recorded 
in the words used”.107 By grounding commercial purpose in the wording of the contract, 
it prevents commercial purpose from being a malleable abstract concept. 
For the avoidance of doubt, the point of disagreement here between proponents of 
the two approaches is not whether courts should be able to re-write commercial contracts 
to make them more fair, or to the court’s subjective idea of what might be commercially 
sensible.108 Nobody seriously argues that, and rightly so, because it would be an 
anathema to the purpose of contract interpretation — it would be giving effect to the 
court’s idea of a nice bargain for the parties rather than the parties’ intentions. The point 
of disagreement is over how pronounced the risk is that judges will do the wrong thing, 
and whether the prescriptive process will actually work. Proponents of prescriptive 
contextualism are, broadly speaking, less formalistic and more trusting of judges. They 
tend to view decisions where courts ultimately depart from plain meaning as perfectly 
explicable in terms of standard principles of contract interpretation, rather than being 
suspicious that the court might have given in to the temptation of abandoning plain 
meaning for a subjectively fair outcome. Accordingly, they are less likely to see a need 
for rules to control judges during the interpretive process. 
  
107 Grabiner, above n 3, at 49. 
108 See the majority judgment of Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, at [77], citing Firm PI 1 , above n 3, at [78]-
[79] and [88]-[93]. 
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Furthermore, proponents of holistic contextualism can question whether 
prescriptive contextualism actually works to constrain judges. The prescriptive 
contextualist does not ask judges to avert their eyes from extrinsic evidence lest they be 
led astray like the parol evidence rule used to do. Grabiner expressly rejects “artificial 
constraints on the admissibility of background material”,109 and rightly so: the parol 
evidence rule was never very successful at preventing extra-textual evidence from 
coming before a judge and influencing him or her, either consciously or sub-consciously, 
because that evidence was only inadmissible for the purpose of contract interpretation 
and could still be put before the judge for other reasons.110 Nevertheless, the prescriptive 
contextualist still expects judges to be able to perform the first two steps of the process, 
which involve nuanced considerations such as the assessment of plain meaning and are 
not simply the application of clear rules, without being influenced by the extra-textual 
context that they are already aware of. Arguably, that is an unrealistic demand that the 
holistic contextualist does not expect of the judiciary. 
E  Does the prescriptive approach miss the fundamental role of context? 
Holistic contextualists argue that context “is always a necessary ingredient in ascertaining 
meaning”, as Tipping J put it.111 The idea of an interpretive process that appears to 
purport to divorce meaning from context, even for a stage or two, arguably “fails to 
recognise the more symbiotic nature of the relationship between words and background”, 
as Glazebrook J put it.112 
 The prescriptive contextualist can respond that no one is seriously arguing that 
words can have an acontextual meaning, and everyone accepts that context necessarily 
  
109 Grabiner, above n 3, at 45. 
110 As Lord Nicholls admitted frankly while writing extra-judicially: Donald Nicholls, “My Kingdom for a 
Horse: The Meaning of Words” (2005) 1 L.Q.R 577, p.578. 
111 Vector Gas, above n 5, at [23]. See also Towne v Eisner 245 U.S. 418 (1918) at 425 per Holmes J and 
Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111(QB), [2013] 1 All ER1321 at 
[133].  
112 Glazebrook J in Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, at [190]. 
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colours meaning — even ‘plain meaning’ is determined in the context of a general 
understanding of how words are used.113 However, acknowledging that context is always 
an ingredient in meaning does not, by itself, as Goh points out, answer the question of 
which context ought to be used for the purposes of contract interpretation.114 The 
prescriptive contextualist can argue that their methodology does not purport to generate 
acontextual meaning. Rather, it searches for the ultimate contextual meaning in a way 
that ensues proper regard is given to what is generally the most important part of the 
context: the words of the contract. As Havelock put it: “The proposition that meaning 
always depends on context does not mean that it only depends on context, for it must also 
primarily depend on the existence of common or conventional meanings of words.”115 
The holistic contextualist’s response116 might be to draw on Lord Hoffmann’s fourth 
principle in ICS:117 
The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a 
reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of 
words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what 
the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have 
been understood to mean. 
 However, this is not really an answer to the prescriptive contextualist’s position, 
because the prescriptive position is not that the meaning of a document is simply the 
dictionary meaning of its words. The notion of plain meaning is more complex than that, 
and draws on conventional meaning not just dictionary meaning.118 So, we cannot fairly 
dismiss developed articulations of the prescriptive approach on the basis that they fail to 
properly appreciate the role of context.  
  
113 See the discussion in Schaeur, above n , pp.527-528. 
114 See Goh, above n 3, at 309-310. 
115 Havelock, above n 3, at 204. 
116 See McLauchlan, “Some Fallacies Concerning the Law of Contract Interpretation”, pp.519-520. 
117 ICS, above n 7, at 913. 
118 See Havelock, above n 3, at 204. 
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F The prescriptive process can inhibit identification of viable interpretations  
Proponents of the prescriptive process argue that starting with plain meaning is necessary 
to mitigate the risk of judges getting misdirected by context. I would suggest that the 
prescriptive approach brings with it its own risk: the plain meaning starting point can 
inhibit the consideration of possible interpretations — the focus on plain meaning risks 
becoming myopic. 
On this point, the recent New Zealand Supreme Court decision New Zealand Air 
Line Pilots’ Association Incorporated v Air New Zealand Ltd (Air Line Pilots’) is 
instructive.119 Air Line Pilots’ was centred on a dispute over the interpretation of a 
collective agreement120 between Air New Zealand and a pilots’ union, the New Zealand 
Air Line Pilots’ Association Incorporated (NZALPA). NZALPA was the larger of the 
two main unions that competed for the membership of pilots flying for Air New Zealand, 
the other being the Federation of Air New Zealand Pilots Incorporated (FANZP). Clause 
24.2 of the collective agreement between NZALPA and Air New Zealand provided 
that:121 
During the term of this Agreement any agreement entered into by [Air New Zealand] 
with any other pilot employee group which is more favourable than provided for in 
this Agreement will be passed on to pilots covered by this Agreement on the written 
request of [NZALPA].  
During the term of the agreement, Air New Zealand entered into a new collective 
agreement with FANZP, which provided for higher rates of pay for some pilots than the 
agreement with NZALPA. The agreement with FANZP also contained some provisions 
that were arguably more favourable to Air New Zealand compared with the NZALPA 
agreement.122 NZALPA then requested that Air New Zealand pass on the higher rates of 
  
119 Air Line Pilots’ , above n 5,. 
120 A ‘collective agreement’ is a binding agreement between one or more unions, one or more employers, 
and two or more employees: Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand), s 5. 
121 Air Line Pilots’ at [1]. 
122 The provisions that were more favourable to Air New Zealand included an undertaking that FANZP and 
its members would not take legal proceedings with respect to a dispute about the allowable meal allowance 
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pay to their collective, citing clause 24.2. Air New Zealand declined, arguing that clause 
24.2 did not allow individually favourable clauses to be passed on and only allowed the 
whole of an agreement with another union to be adopted. 
The Employment Court took a holistic contextual approach to interpretation, and 
found in favour of NZALPA’s interpretation, in part on the basis that cl 24.2 was a 
concession that Air New Zealand made to NZALPA to try and prevent a strike.123 The 
principles of contract interpretation are central to the Air Line Pilots’ case at the Court of 
Appeal level and beyond, because overturning an Employment Court decision requires 
identifying an operative error in the statement or application of those principles.124 The 
 
and removal of ‘35/7’ (i.e. no more than 35 hours in a seven-day period) flying restrictions. See New 
Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Assn Inc (NZALPA) v Air New Zealand Ltd (NZALPA v Air NZ) [2014] NZEmpC 
168, (2014) 12 NZELR 401 at [47].  
123 NZALPA v Air NZ (2014) 12 NZELR 401. The judgment included a wide-ranging discussion of the 
textual and extra-textual context as well as commercial sense. Notably, the discussion of interpretation does 
not commence with identifying the plain meaning of the pivotal words. Indeed, the closest thing to a 
discussion of the meaning of the word “agreement” by itself comprises one paragraph in the middle of a 
discussion of business commonsense, at [65]. 
124 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 214(1): “A party to a proceeding under this Act who is dissatisfied 
with a decision of the court (other than a decision on the construction of … a collective employment 
agreement) as being wrong in law may, with the leave of the Court of Appeal, appeal to the Court of 
Appeal against the decision”. At first glance, one could think that s 214(1) would mean that there was no 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, since the dispute centred on the interpretation of a clause in a collective 
employment agreement. That was the position under an earlier era of employment law in New Zealand, 
that, as McGrath J put it in Secretary for Education v Yates (2005) 2 NZELR 423 (CA) at [5], citing 
Combined Unions v NZMC Ltd [1983] ACJ 233 at 239 and Foodtown Supermarkets Ltd v NZ Shop 
Employees IAW [1984] ACJ 1043 (CA) at 1048 per Somers J: “reserve[d] to the Arbitration Court, and its 
successors, the exclusive right to interpret awards, applying its specialist knowledge and expertise without 
being restrained by technical legal principle”. However, the Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 135 which 
is identical in effect to s 214 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, ushered in a new philosophy that, as 
William Young J put it in Secretary for Education v Yates (2005) 2 NZELR 423 (CA) at [97]: “parties to 
Employment Court litigation are entitled to the application of orthodox legal principles.” The courts have 
taken that proposition seriously, see Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34; [2005] 3 NZLR. 721 at 
[20] n 21. 
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Court of Appeal noted that counsel for Air New Zealand had not raised any objections to 
the exposition of the principles of contract interpretation by the Employment Court,125 
and observed that there had been two new authoritative re-statements of the law of 
contract interpretation since the Employment Court’s decision, Firm PI 1 and Arnold v 
Britton,126 but said nothing to suggest that these new authorities brought the Employment 
Court’s statement of principles into question. 
 However, the Court of Appeal found that the Employment Court had made an 
operative error in the application of the principles of contract interpretation. In short, the 
Court of Appeal considered that “agreement” has a plain meaning, which refers to the 
whole of an agreement, and that the Employment Court failed to give proper regard to 
that plain meaning.127 In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal worked through 
the steps in the prescriptive process and, having identified a clear plain meaning, found 
nothing in the textual or extra-textual context or in the idea of commercial sense to depart 
from it.128 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found in favour of Air New Zealand’s 
interpretation. 
 The Supreme Court, however, was unanimous in rejecting the premise that there 
were only two viable interpretations of cl 24.2.129 At the hearing of the case in the 
Supreme Court, members of the Court raised with counsel two other possible 
  
125 Air New Zealand Ltd v New Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Assoc Incorp (Air New Zealand), above n 77, at 
[31]. 
126 Air New Zealand at [34]-[35]. 
127 Air New Zealand at [47]. 
128 Air New Zealand, step one at [40]-[50], step two at [51]-[57], step three at [58]-[64] and step four at 
[65]-[75]. 
129 Air Line Pilots’, above n 5, per Ellen France J, with whom Arnold and O’Regan JJ agreed, at [93]-[97], 
William Young J at [114]-[119], Glazebrook J at [195]-[197]. The case did not resolve the question of 
which was the correct interpretation, with a majority finding only that the Employment Court was wrong to 
find in favour of the interpretation that NZALPA had argued for. See Ellen France J at [97]-[100] and 
William Young J at [145]-[146] for the factors that led to this outcome. 
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interpretations which, William Young J recounted, was not received warmly by 
counsel.130  
 The first alternative interpretation is that cl 24.2 allows for the NZALPA to 
incorporate a specific beneficial provision into their agreement, but only if they also 
incorporate any corresponding dis-benefits linked to that particular provision.131 The 
second, taking a “wider interpretation” of “agreement”, as the majority put it,132 is that cl 
24.2 allows a particular group of pilots to take on all the terms (favourable and otherwise) 
in the other agreement that apply to that group. William Young J stated in his judgment 
that there may be other interpretations worth considering,133 and Glazebrook J raised the 
possibility of a third interpretation in her judgment.134 
 Of course, the fact that counsel for each side had each argued for one 
interpretation played a role in the Court of Appeal treating the case as a context between 
two viable readings. But it will often be the case that each side argues for an 
interpretation that is particularly favourable to their client, and there is no reason for a 
court to buy into that framing. Interpretation is concerned with the parties’ collective 
intentions expressed in their contract, and not with determining which of the parties 
succeeded in imposing their subjective intentions over the other. Accordingly, the court 
should at least entertain the possibility of middle-ground interpretations that best reflect 
the parties’ collective intentions. This is where, I would suggest, the prescriptive process 
  
130 Air Line Pilots’ at [120]. 
131 Air Line Pilots’, see Ellen France J, with whom Arnold and O’Regan JJ agreed, at [94], William Young 
J at [114]. 
132 Air Line Pilots’, see Ellen France J, with whom Arnold and O’Regan JJ agreed, at [95]. See also 
William Young J at [114]. 
133 Air Line Pilots’ at [114]-[115] per William Young J. 
134 Air Line Pilots’, at [196] per Glazebrook J: “any additional pay not related to any additional burdens 
should be passed on under the clause.” Glazebrook J suggested at [197] that this might be the most 
plausible interpretation of cl 24.2, on the basis that “[i]f any additional burdens had to be passed on for cl 




led the Court of Appeal astray. The Court of Appeal’s blindness to other interpretations 
can be traced back to its first step in the interpretive process being a consideration of the 
plain meaning of the word “agreement”. Having found a plain meaning, that plain 
meaning drove the rest of the interpretive process, at the expense of other viable 
interpretations. This is not simply a case where too much weight was attached to plain 
meaning, leading to the wrong interpretation being chosen. Rather, this is a more serious 
sort of error: a failure to even consider interpretations which could have turned out to best 
capture the parties’ intentions in the eyes of the law. That the prescriptive process can 
produce such errors gives us a significant reason to doubt its desirability. 
 That said, I can identify two arguments for why the Court of Appeal’s decision is 
a flawed application of the prescriptive process and does not give us good reason to doubt 
the merits of that approach in general. The first is that the prescriptive process does not 
prohibit new viable interpretations arising as the court ventures beyond plain meaning to 
work through the following steps, so there was nothing to prevent the Court of Appeal 
from identifying alterative interpretations, even though the parties had not argued them. 
This argument is unpersuasive, however, as a detailed and syntactical analysis of plain 
meaning practically invites the overlooking of other interpretations. 
The second argument that the Court of Appeal failed to properly apply the 
prescriptive methodology is that the Court of Appeal did not correctly identify the 
centrally important words in the dispute. The Court of Appeal found that the words “any 
agreement” were the centrally important words, so considered the plain meaning of those 
particular words, before going on to consider them in the context of cl 24.2 and then the 
contract as a whole. Arguably, a proper application of the prescriptive methodology 
would have been to identify the whole of cl 24.2 as being the relevant words, and then 
consider the plain meaning of the clause, before considering the clause in the context of 
the text as a whole. That is a different exercise to determining the plain meaning of “any 
agreement”, because the plain meaning of a clause takes into account, but is not 
determined solely by, the conventional meanings of the words of that clause.135 
  
135 See the discussion under ‘III.E Plain meaning plays a role’.  
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In my view, this second argument has some merit, because the authorities do seem 
to envisage the centrally relevant words being a clause rather than words (or a word) in a 
clause.136 So, the Court of Appeal was arguably not faithful to the prescriptive process, 
although it is not clear that considering the plain meaning of the whole of cl 24.2 would 
have been of assistance in identifying additional interpretations. However, consideration 
of this issue of the centrally relevant words in Air Line Pilots’ brings us to my second 
argument: identifying the centrally relevant words is an absolutely crucial step in the 
prescriptive process, but the idea that there are easily discoverable centrally important 
words is questionable. 
G  The ‘centrally important words’ will not always be obvious 
Identifying the centrally important words is a pivotal step in the prescriptive process, 
because it is the plain meaning of those particular words that is carried through the rest 
of the process. Other parts of the contract form the textual context of the centrally 
important words, to be consulted only after consideration of the plain meaning of the 
centrally relevant words. Thus, identification of which words are the centrally important 
ones can be a key driver of the outcome in any particular case.  
 However, it will not always be easy to identify the ‘right’ centrally relevant 
words, especially considering that the court is supposed to do so prior to a full 
consideration of the textual and extra-textual context. True, disputes are often explained 
as being about a particular part of the contract. However, there will be a number of inter-
related provisions and clauses that define words or phrases in other clauses, as in 
Aberdeen City Council137 and Wood v Capita, as the following paragraph from the latter 
decision illustrates:138 
The indemnity in clause 7.11 is an addition to the detailed warranties in schedule 4. 
The mis-selling which clause 7.11 addresses is also covered by the warranty in para 
14.1 of schedule 4: paras 18 and 19 above. But liability for the schedule 4 warranties 
  
136 See above n 51. 
137 Aberdeen City Council, above n 55. See above at ‘C.2: Step two: Textual context’. 
138 Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [27]. 
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is time-limited by schedule 5. In particular para 3.1(b) of that schedule (para 20 
above) required the Company to claim within two years of the completion of the sale 
and purchase. The scope of the clause 7.11 indemnity, breach of which gives rise to 
a liability which is unlimited in time, falls to be assessed in the context of those time 
limited warranties. 
 Consider, for example, a case involving a dispute about the application of a 
clause, some of the words of which are defined in an interpretation provision. Is the 
clause centrally relevant while the interpretation provision is part of the textual context? 
If so, the Court should consider the plain meaning of the clause before turning to the 
interpretation provision as part of the textual context. It seems unnecessary and perhaps 
contrary to the parties’ intentions for a Court to first concern itself with plain meaning 
when the parties themselves have provided a definition. 
 Alternatively, one might suggest that both the clause and its interpretation 
provision are centrally relevant. That might initially seem appealing but, the more words 
are considered centrally relevant, the less likely it is that those words could collectively 
be said to have one particular plain meaning, and the more cumbersome the process of 
considering them becomes. This would undermine the certainty that the prescriptive 
approach is supposed to offer. 
 The holistic approach does away with the need to pick one particular part of the 
contract a priori to revolve the exercise of interpretation around, and does not give the 
plain meaning of one particular clause a disproportionate role in the process. Although 
the holistic approach might pick a certain clause as the entry point into the interpretive 
process, it allows for what initially might have appeared to the centrally relevant words to 
fade into the background when it becomes clear that something in the textual or extra-
textual context provides greater insight into the parties’ intentions. Thus, it does not 
matter if the Court did not initially identify the ‘right’ centrally important words. 
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IV  Conclusion 
Lord Hoffmann stated in ICS that much of the old intellectual baggage of legal 
interpretation has been discarded.139 The dialogue about the development of the 
principles of contract interpretation is most productive if we focus on the sometimes-
subtle differences in the emerging approaches to modern contract interpretation, rather 
than try and retrieve discarded approaches, or knock down straw men. No one is seriously 
suggesting that Courts should not pay close attention to the words that the parties have 
used, especially if those words have a plain meaning. Neither is anyone proposing a 
return to blunt literalism.140 As Lord Hodge put it in a passage that is sure to be quoted 
again and again:141  
Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for exclusive 
occupation of the field of contractual interpretation. Rather, the lawyer and the 
judge, when interpreting any contract, can use them as tools to ascertain the 
objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their 
agreement. 
 Where reasonable people can disagree, however, is on how best to explain the 
relative roles that plain meaning, context, and commercial sense play in the interpretive 
process. Here, I have argued that two rival approaches have emerged in the post-ICS era 
of modern contextual contract interpretation. The prescriptive approach requires courts to 
first consider the plain meaning of the centrally important words to the dispute, before 
considering textual and extra-textual context, and finally commercial sense. The holistic 
approach also considers those same factors as a unitary exercise. Which approach is 
preferable depends in part on one’s position on the importance of certainty in contract 
law, the extent to which commercial parties actually pay close attention to wording, and 
whether judges are in need of constraint lest they be led astray by wily lawyers. I favour 
the holistic approach, and have suggested that the focus on plain meaning that is 
  
139 ICS, above n 7, at 912. 
140 And, of course, it is arguable that there never really was an era of blunt literalism to return to. See above 
n 12 and accompanying text. 
141 Wood v Capita, above n 1, at [13]. 
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characteristic of the prescriptive approach brings with it the risk of failing to identify 
viable interpretations. I have also argued that the pivotal role that the centrally important 
words play for the prescriptive approach is a problem, because the identification of 
‘centrally important words’ is less straight-forward than it may at first appear.  
 
